



The Election Integrity

Partnership

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**Examples of Election** 

Disinformation

3:32



6:07

The Long Fuse











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Page 1

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5	ALIDTO MDANCODIDMION
	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION
6	IN RE: STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL.
7	VS.
8	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., ET AL.
9	CASE NO. 322CV01213
10	EVENT: ATLANTIC COUNCIL: LIGHTNING TALK: ELECTION
11	INTEGRITY PARTNERSHIP
12	JUNE 24, 2021
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14	
15	
16	(Due to the quality of the recorded media, portions
17	were unable to be transcribed and include inaudible
18	portions. The transcript may also include
19	misinterpreted words and/or unidentified speakers.
20	The transcriber was not present at the time of the
21	recording; therefore, this transcript should not be
22	considered verbatim.)
23	
24	TRANSCRIBED BY: MELISSA LANE
25	

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Page 2

1	(CLIP: 1:38-3:19)
2	ALEX STAMOS: The election integrity
3	partnership started with our team in Stanford sending
4	a group of interns to go work with the the cyber
5	security and infrastructure security agency at the DHS
6	to work election security. And what these interns
7	found is, there's a lot of opportunity for them to
8	contribute to the technical components of election
9	security. They also found that there was a lack of
10	capability around election disinformation. This is
11	not because CISA didn't care about disinformation, but
12	at the time they lacked both kind of the funding and
13	the legal authorizations to go do the kinds of work
14	that would be necessary to truly understand how
15	election disinformation was operated.
16	So because of the feedback and the ideas
17	from this group, we were able to pull together pretty
18	quickly a project between four different institutions
19	to try to fill the gap of the things that the
20	government cannot do themselves. There are kind
21	of four major stakeholders that we operated with that
22	we worked beside at EIP. Our partners in government,
23	most particularly those in CISA and DHS, but also in
24	all of the local and state governments with whom we
25	operated with with the election integrity

Page 3

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infrastructure ISAC. We worked with civil society groups such as NAACP, MITRE coming cause and the healthy election project that worked at both MIT and Stanford, and then we also worked with the major platforms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Reddit, Next Door and the like. I mean, some of those cases we had agreements for access of data. In other cases, we had to have individual analysts go work with them.  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25		
healthy election project that worked at both MIT and  Stanford, and then we also worked with the major  platforms, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, TikTok, Reddit,  Next Door and the like. I mean, some of those cases  we had agreements for access of data. In other cases,  we had to have individual analysts go work with them.  y  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24	1	infrastructure ISAC. We worked with civil society
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8 we had to have individual analysts go work with them. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	6	Next Door and the like. I mean, some of those cases
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	8	we had to have individual analysts go work with them.
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	13	
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18         19         20         21         22         23         24	16	
<ul> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> </ul>	17	
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23 24	21	
24	22	
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Page 4

1	(CLIP: 10:29-12:31)
2	ALEX STAMOS: We find very little evidence
3	that there's any foreign involvement at all. In fact,
4	the vast majority of election disinformation in 2020
5	came from Americans who had verified accounts and very
6	large follower accounts.
7	So as one of the big changes that we point
8	out in our report is that this information is much
9	less about massive amplification. It's honestly less
10	about things like algorithms and algorithmic
11	amplification. It's a much more important factor now
12	is that there are large follower account political
13	partisans who are spreading misinformation
14	intentionally, doing so in a multi-media context. So
15	they're doing so online, on social media, but they're
16	also doing so on cable news, doing so on the radio,
17	through a variety of different outlets and are able to
18	amplify their message and to motivate their followers
19	to go try find evidence of the incorrect claims that
20	they're making.
21	Where does this leave us for 2022 and 2024?
22	So the election integrity partnership was a project
23	just for 2020. We are looking at options for these
24	different groups to work together in the future
25	elections, but there is going to have to be work in

Page 5

1	the federal government level to decide, one, who is in
2	the government is going to own disinformation as a
3	problem. That is something that for at least in the
4	American domestic context has not been figured out.
5	And second, what kind of role should the academic and
6	the NGO sector play here?
7	And one thing we're going to have to figure
8	out is, not just from a funding perspective, but from
9	a privacy and data access perspective. One of the
10	things that continues to happen is, we continue to get
11	tighter and tighter privacy laws being passed around
12	access to online social media data, and as long as
13	that is happening, we're going to have to take into
14	account those issues, and the need for academic
15	research when passing those laws.
16	So this is something that we're going to
17	continue to write about and talk about as we work with
18	our partners to figure out how the same kind of
19	function that the EIP filled in 2020, can be filled by
20	somebody in 2022 and 2024.
21	(Audio ended.)
22	
23	
24	
25	

Page 6

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	
3	I, Melissa J. Lane, Certified Court
4	Reporter of Missouri, Certified Shorthand Reporter of
5	Illinois and Registered Professional Reporter, do
6	hereby certify that I was asked to prepare a
7	transcript of proceedings had in the above-mentioned
8	case, which proceedings were held with no court
9	reporter present utilizing an open microphone system
10	of preserving the record.
11	I further certify that the foregoing pages
12	constitute a true and accurate reproduction of the
13	proceedings as transcribed by me to the best of my
14	ability and may include inaudible sections or
15	misidentified speakers of said open microphor
16	recording.
17	Melissey Lone.
18	
19	Melissa J. Lane, CCR, CSR, RPR
20	
21	
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A	2:10	4:15,16,16	future 4:24	4:14
ability 6:14	care 2:11	domestic 5:4		interns 2:4
<b>able</b> 2:17	<b>case</b> 1:9 6:8	<b>Door</b> 3:6	G	2:6
4:17	<b>cases</b> 3:6,7	<b>Due</b> 1:16	<b>gap</b> 2:19	involvement
above-me	cause 3:2		go 2:4,13	4:3
6:7	<b>CCR</b> 6:19	E	3:8 4:19	<b>ISAC</b> 3:1
academic 5:5	CERTIFICATE	<b>EIP</b> 2:22	going 4:25	issues 5:14
5:14	6 <b>:</b> 1	5 <b>:</b> 19	5:2,7,13	
access 3:7	Certified	election	5 <b>:</b> 16	J
5:9,12	6:3,4	1:10 2:2,6	government	<b>J</b> 6:3,19
account 4:12	certify 6:6	2:8,10,15	2:20,22	<b>JOSEPH</b> 1:8
5:14	6:11 <sup>-</sup>	2:25 3:3	5:1 <b>,</b> 2	<b>JR</b> 1:8
accounts 4:5	changes 4:7	4:4,22	governments	<b>JUNE</b> 1:12
4:6	CISA 2:11,23	elections	2:24	
accurate	<b>civil</b> 3:1	4:25	group 2:4,17	K
6:12	claims 4:19	<b>ended</b> 5:21	groups 3:2	kind 2:12,20
agency 2:5	<b>CLIP</b> 2:1 4:1	<b>ET</b> 1:6,8	4:24	5:5,18
agreements	coming 3:2	<b>EVENT</b> 1:10		kinds 2:13
3:7	components	evidence 4:2	<u> </u>	
<b>AL</b> 1:6,8	2:8	4:19	<b>happen</b> 5:10	L
<b>ALEX</b> 2:2 4:2	considered		happening	lack 2:9
algorithmic	1:22	<u> </u>	5:13	lacked 2:12
4:10	constitute	Facebook 3:5	healthy 3:3	Lane 1:24
algorithms	6 <b>:</b> 12	<b>fact</b> 4:3	held 6:8	6:3,19
4:10	context 4:14	factor 4:11	honestly 4:9	large 4:6,12
American 5:4	5 <b>:</b> 4	federal 5:1		laws 5:11,15
Americans	continue	feedback	ideas 2:16	leave 4:21
4:5	5:10,17	2:16	Illinois 6:5	<pre>legal 2:13 level 5:1</pre>
amplific	continues	figure 5:7		
4:9,11	5:10	5:18	important 4:11	LIGHTNING 1:10
<b>amplify</b> 4:18	contribute	figured 5:4	inaudible	little 4:2
analysts3:8	2:8	<b>fill</b> 2:19 <b>filled</b> 5:19	1:17 6:14	local 2:24
<b>and/or</b> 1:19	COUNCIL 1:10		include 1:17	long 5:12
asked6:6	court 6:3,8	5:19	1:18 6:14	looking 4:23
ATLANTIC	CSR 6:19	<b>find</b> 4:2,19 <b>follower</b> 4:6	incorrect	lot 2:7
1:10	<b>cyber</b> 2 : 4	4:12	4:19	1002.7
<b>Audio</b> 1:5		followers	individual	М
5:21	data 3:7 5:9	4:18	3:8	major 2:21
authoriz	5:12	foregoing	information	3:4
2:13	<b>decide</b> 5:1	6:11	4:8	majority 4:4
——————————————————————————————————————	DHS 2:5,23	foreign 4:3	infrastr	making 4:20
<u>B</u>	different	found 2:7,9	2:5 3:1	massive 4:9
<b>best</b> 6:13	2:18 4:17	four 2:18,21	institut	<b>mean</b> 3:6
BIDEN 1:8	4:24	function	2:18	<b>media</b> 1:16
<b>big</b> 4:7	disinfor	5:19	integrity	4:15 5:12
	2:10,11,15	funding 2:12	1:11 2:2	Melissa 1:24
	4:4 5:2	5:8	2:25 4:22	6:3,19
cable 4:16 capability	doing 4:14	further 6:11	intentio	message 4:18
Cananiitu	~~+y I. + I	, - <del></del>	1	1

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microphone	perspective	<b>role</b> 5:5	1:17,24	
6:9,15	5:8,9	RPR 6:19	6 <b>:</b> 13	
misident	platforms		transcriber	0
6:15	3:5	S	1:20	
misinfor	<b>play</b> 5:6	second 5:5	transcript	1
4:13	point 4:7	sections	1:18,21	1:38-3:19
misinter	political	6:14	6 <b>:</b> 7	2:1
1:19	4:12	sector 5:6	TRANSCRI	10:29-12:31
Missouri 1:6	portions	security 2:5	1:5	4:1
6 <b>:</b> 4	1:16,18	2:5,6,9	<b>true</b> 6:12	
MIT 3:3	prepare 6:6	sending2:3	<b>truly</b> 2:14	2
<b>MITRE</b> 3:2	<pre>present1:20</pre>	Shorthand	<b>try</b> 2:19	<b>2020</b> 4:4,23
motivate	6 <b>:</b> 9	6 <b>:</b> 4	4:19	5:19
4:18	preserving	social 4:15	Twitter 3:5	<b>2021</b> 1:12
multi-media	6:10	5 <b>:</b> 12		<b>2022</b> 4:21
4:14	<b>pretty</b> 2:17	society3:1	U	5:20
	privacy 5:9	somebody	<b>unable</b> 1:17	<b>2024</b> 4:21
<u>N</u>	5:11	5:20	understand	5:20
<b>NAACP</b> 3:2	<pre>problem 5:3</pre>	speakers	2:14	<b>24</b> 1:12
necessary	proceedings	1:19 6:15	unidenti	
2:14	6:7,8,13	spreading	1:19	3
need 5:14	Professi	4:13	utilizing	322CV01213
news 4:16	6:5	stakehol	6:9	1:9
<b>NGO</b> 5 : 6	project 2:18	2:21		
0	3:3 4:22	STAMOS 2:2	variety 4:17	
online 4:15	<b>pull</b> 2:17	4:2 <b>Stanford</b> 2:3	variety 4:17	
5:12	Q	3:4	verbatim	
open 6:9,15	quality 1:16	started2:3	1:22	
operated	quartey::10	state1:6	verified 4:5	
2:15,21,25	quickly 2.10	2:24	<b>vs</b> 1:7	
opportunity	R	system 6:9		
2:7	R1:8		W	
options 4:23	<b>radio</b> 4:16	T	we're5:7,13	
outlets 4:17	record 6:10	<b>take</b> 5:13	5:16	
	recorded	<b>talk</b> 1:10	words 1:19	
P	1:16	5 <b>:</b> 17	work 2:4,6	
pages 6:11	recording	<b>team</b> 2:3	2:13 3:8	
particul	1:21 6:16	technical	4:24,25	
2:23	Reddit 3:5	2:8	5 <b>:</b> 17	
partisans	Registered	thing 5:7	<b>worked</b> 2:22	
4:13	6 <b>:</b> 5	things 2:19	3:1,3,4	
partners	report 4:8	4:10 5:10	<b>write</b> 5:17	
2:22 5:18	reporter 6:1	tighter 5:11	x	
partnership	6:4,4,5,9	5:11		
1:11 2:3	reproduc	<b>TikTok</b> 3:5	Y	
4:22	6:12	time 1:20	<b>YouTube</b> 3:5	
passed 5:11	research	2:12	Tourabe:	
passing 5:15	5:15	transcribed		
	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>

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